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In this paper, Alavi brings together an interview and academic 
scholarship on the 1971 partition of East and West Pakistan 
and the independence of Bangladesh. Throughout the paper, 
the author works through theories of nationalism to unpack 
how competing nationalist myths informed the events and 
aftermath of the 1971 Bangladesh War of Independence. Alavi 
argues for the importance of oral narratives as a way of bearing 
witness to histories that are overshadowed by nationalist 
myths. An earlier version of this essay was produced for an oral 
history assignment for the course Introduction to South Asian 
Studies (SOSC 2435) at York University and was the winner of 
the York Centre for Asian Research’s 2016 Undergraduate Asia 
Essay Award.
Crowds of furious pro-Mujib or Mukhti Bahini (Bangladeshi armed 
resistance movement) militia took strength from the incoming 
Indian army and this started a murderous rampage of Bangali 
versus Bihari killings. Mobs of machete-yielding youth attacked 
Naseerabad Housing Society residents. I could hear people being 
hacked to death and women being abused. The houses on both 
sides of my home were raided and slaughtered, but we were lucky 
in the sense that our domestic helpers saved us. They accosted 
the mob at the gates and convinced them that the house was 
empty. We kept hidden in the house, and then when the Pakistani 
army came to this city we were escorted out by them and taken 
to the cantonment. In the safety of the cantonment area we 
stayed for about three weeks and then took the last ship Safina 
e Arab to West Pakistan via Columbo. Indian forces even at that 
time were stronger than [the] Pakistani Navy. They closed off the 
waterway that led to West Pakistan and the ship was marooned 
near the Columbo waters for three weeks. Since my uncle … was 
the Pakistani ambassador to Columbo, he had to assert his official 
status and was thus able to get a concession for this ship to pass 
Indian waters. We had been lucky, but many of our relatives were 
murdered or maimed during the raids and never got to get out of 
Bangladesh. Many Biharis of lesser financial means were left to rot 
in Bangladeshi camps.
 Kausar Alavi
(See Appendix for full interview transcript)
My research is on a topic that is very close to my heart since 
my grandfather was murdered during the 1971 genocide that 
engulfed the eastern wing of Pakistan. My husband was born in 
East Pakistan and was schooled there. As a result, he witnessed 
firsthand the communal riots that ensued after the ill-fated 
elections of 1970. This interview is an excerpt from a talk that I 
had with him about his experiences during the last days of what 
was then East Pakistan. In this interview he talks about his last 
three weeks in Chittagong, his brush with death and his safe trip 
back to West Pakistan, on the last ship called Safina e Arab, sailing 
from Dhaka to Karachi via Columbo in December 1971.
The reason I chose to interview my husband is because he lived 
in Chittagong and witnessed the socio-political realities of the 
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Bangladeshi people. My position during the interview remained 
that of an objective/reflexive observer. I heard many stories of 
Bangladeshi agitation during my childhood, and for most of my life 
I believed in the West Pakistani version of events. It was actually 
while taking the Introduction to South Asian Studies course at 
York University that I had a chance to reassess my feelings about 
the events that befell Bangladesh and to rethink my prejudices. 
Since being introduced to relevant literature, I have changed the 
way that I have been looking at the conflict. This paper, therefore, 
is an attempt to re-address the reality of the Bangladesh War of 
Independence from my own perspective. Some of the themes that 
have emerged during the interview and over the course of my 
research are the modern concepts of nation building, the sense of 
exclusion experienced by the oppressed Bangla community, their 
rebellion, and the related socio-political machinations of West 
Pakistani elites. 
Consequentially, my paper analyzes some of the reasons that 
have led to the secession of East Pakistan from West Pakistan, 
and it analyzes how the breakage has affected those who have 
survived it. In order to understand the conflict that developed 
between East and West Pakistan after the independence of 
Pakistan from British rule, we need to briefly review the history 
of pre-partition politics of 1947 India. In a historical review by 
Bose and Jalal (2004) in the chapter, “The Partition of India and 
Creation of Pakistan,” the authors contend that the concept 
of an Indian-Muslim identity in South Asia has been more of a 
British construct than a reality. “Islamic identity was strewn with 
sectarian and doctrinal differences” (137), and in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, it occurred more in the minds of Islamic 
scholars rather than in the social fabric of society (137). As a 
result, the concept of an overarching Indian-Islamic identity has 
been nothing more than a political stunt on the part of British 
colonizers to formulate their divide and rule strategy. 
We might conclude that the partition of India on the basis of a 
two-nation theory has been flawed from the beginning, since the 
concept of a cohesive Muslim identity has never existed amongst 
South Asian Muslims. Nevertheless, Pakistan did succeed in 
gaining independence from India on the premise of its Muslim 
... the concept of a cohesive 
Muslim identity has never existed 
amongst South Asian Muslims.
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identity and thus Muslim majority areas were shaped into one 
nation (with the exception of Kashmir). The problems that plagued 
East Pakistan from the start of Pakistan’s independence were 
due to the fact that although the eastern wing was included 
on the basis of its religious affinity with West Pakistan, religion 
itself was not enough to keep the two sides together. Anderson 
(2006) defines the modern concept of the nation as “an imagined 
political community – imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign” (6). 
He notes that nations are imagined entities, and while they are 
imagined as sovereign and limited, they are also imagined as a 
“community.” This imagined unity thus bestowed the idea that 
nation building tends to denote a unity of culture, language and 
ideas, such that the nation is perceived in the eyes of the nation-
builders as a homogenous entity, whereas in reality this imagined 
community is fraught with ethnic and political inner tensions. 
Kreuzer and Weiberg (2005) in their paper titled “Framing 
Violence, Nation and State Building” explain that inherent societal 
tensions arise primairly because the majority of the population 
in multi-ethnic countries think of nations in ethnic terms (10). 
In other words, “various groups try to impose on the state and 
the national identity their own cultural features” (10). If nation 
building is understood in ethnic terms (as in the case of Pakistan, 
the new nation was perceived in terms of Urdu as the national 
language) and the state is perceived as a nation state, the “need 
for nation-building is often equated with conquering the nation 
state and extending one’s own culture over the whole national 
realm” (10). 
Hence, when we analyze the conflict between East and West 
Pakistan from this perspective we are able to better understand 
the involvement of culture and politics in the nation-building 
project of Bangladesh. Historically, the Bangla natives of East 
Pakistan maintained themselves as a distinct cultural and linguistic 
group with their own historical and cultural roots and separate 
from their West Pakistani “imagined” compatriots. Apparently, 
apart from the concept of a common religious identity, nothing 
else held them together. Due to its political influence, the West 
Pakistani elite assumed de facto ownership of the entire nation, 
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allocating all of the national resources and asserting their right to 
govern.  They had, according to Kreuzer and Weiberg’s explanation 
(2005), extended their power by extending their own culture 
and politics inside the eastern province as well. As a result, in the 
conflict of Bangalis versus Biharis in East Pakistan, for example, 
any coercive attempts to impose one version of the nation 
against the ‘other’ has often ended up “in the violent rebellion 
of the suppressed group, or state violence perpetrated by the 
hegemonial group in order to silence the opponents” (11).
Siddiqa (2016), in her Express Tribune article titled “Competing 
Modernity,” makes a relevant observation: she asserts that Allama 
Iqbal (the founder of the “two-nation” theory) sowed the seeds of 
a Muslim nation-state based on the negation of the “traditional, 
religious framework represented by Pirs and saints as archaic,” 
and introduced the concept of a “Sharia based interpretation or 
following the Quran and Sunnah in letter and spirit model” as the 
basic formula that he had hoped would replace ethnic differences 
in the making of a modern Islamic state. The key assumption on 
the part of Allama Iqbal and the early “two-nation” advocates 
was that once ethnicity was replaced by religion, Pakistan 
would become an ideal “Islamic” state. This formula was proven 
wrong on many levels in the making of Pakistan because the 
persistence of Bangla ethnic identity in East Pakistan could not 
find a place within the West Pakistani ideology of a nation state 
based on Islam. The idea of religion as a counter agent to ethnic 
and political differences did not pan out in the way Iqbal had 
envisioned. 
In the same vein, Toor (2011), in her book The State of Islam, 
argued that post-independence, East Pakistan continued to pose 
“a potent political threat” for the Muslim League’s western wing 
(35). It was, after all, demographically a larger province, with fifty 
per cent of the Pakistani population. In the event of a democratic 
election, East Pakistan was poised to dominate national politics. 
Alternatively, East Pakistan had an existing culture of political 
consciousness and activism, which had gained further momentum 
in the post-Partition period. This activism continued to pose 
a threat for the West Pakistani ruling elite. My interviewee 
recounted the many inequalities that the native population of East 
The idea of religion as a counter 
agent to ethnic and political 
differences did not pan out in the 
way Iqbal had envisioned.
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Pakistan faced once Pakistan came into existence (see appendix). 
Ownerships of industries and seaports were allocated to the elite 
establishments of West Pakistan, and the native population was 
sidestepped in all national and political matters. 
Toor (2011) also describes the subversion of Bangla language and 
culture and the thrusting of Urdu as the only official language of 
Pakistan upon East Pakistan.  Urdu became the official national 
language despite Bangla being the most widely spoken language 
in Pakistan, owing to the size of the Bangla population in East 
Pakistan. The controversy of Bangla versus Urdu was further 
aggravated by the “politics of class, region and ethnicity” (27). My 
interview with my husband revealed a firsthand account of how 
such discrepancies and blatant injustices were meted out to the 
Bangla-speaking population. The skewed political manoeuverings 
of West Pakistani elites caused the schism between the two 
wings, resulting in huge physical and psychological destruction. 
Widespread anarchy ensued, resulting in thousands of families 
being separated, homes and businesses being plundered, and 
individuals killed or imprisoned in local or Indian jails. Many of our 
relatives were taken away by Mukhti Bahini (Bangladeshi armed 
resistance movement) militants and persecuted.
Although I have only interviewed my husband for this paper, both 
of my parents also hold memories of displacement from this 
period in East Pakistan’s history. For some, like my parents, this 
displacement has been twofold, for they belong to that particular 
group of individuals for whom the event of migration has never 
concluded. They survived the partition of India and the genocide 
in East Pakistan, and now reside in Canada as immigrants. 
According to my father, the “chain of migration, the moving away 
from one’s base, is a process of unmooring that never ends.”
Consequentially, what public narratives of history have often 
failed to document in general is the private pain and loss of such 
displaced individuals, those who have not only lost their loved 
ones and their sense of belonging, but have also lost out on many 
different facets of their lives as well. My father recalls his home in 
Fatehpur, India, which was a haveli (a private mansion), housing 
a private mosque and his ancestral burial ground. Partition for 
... what public narratives of history 
have often failed to document in 
general is the private pain and loss 
of such displaced individuals ...
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my father has not only meant the loss of his family legacy but 
also his home and his right to be buried with his own kith and 
kin. These are precisely the types of narratives that are often 
not told: in fact they hold no significance in the public versions 
of Partition narratives. I suppose this is the reason why oral 
narratives need to be witnessed as they encapsulate the processes 
of memorialization, of being talked about and remembered – bits 
and pieces of people’s lives that are forgotten in time yet continue 
to hold an importance for those who are left behind. By recalling 
these stories, we are not only giving voice to forgotten people, 
but also acting as witnesses to past events that bring our past to 
life, if not on a public level, then at least on a personal level in the 
form of oral narratives from our ancestors and kin, such that these 
narratives become a shared legacy of our past.
In the end, if you ask me what I gained from this exercise, I will 
tell you that I learned about the pain and loss of fragmented 
relationships and forgotten histories. It is my belief that an 
unmooring of people from their ancestral lands can never be a 
good thing, since no matter how our political leaders rationalize 
these dividing events, such divisions continue to be the cause of 
great personal loss and anguish.
By recalling these stories, we are 
not only giving voice to forgotten 
people, but also acting as 
witnesses to past events that bring 
our past to life...
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APPENDIX
Interviewer: Fareeha Alavi
Interviewee: Kausar Alavi
Date of interview: 1 March 2016
Question: In your opinion what lead to the partition of East 
Pakistan, and what can you tell me about that time, since you 
were there and have experienced the making of Bangladesh 
firsthand?
Response: The general elections of 1970 created the final chaos 
(since in it Shaikh Mujibur Rahamn’s Awami League Party had 
gained an overwhelming majority, yet Bhutto did not accept his 
defeat) but this was not the only rift between the two sides. 
Resources from East Pakistan like jute, paper and textiles were 
taken over by West Pakistani businessman, earnings were 
transferred over to the western side as well. Bangladeshis were 
being robbed of their own resources and being mistreated by the 
business owners. There was obvious inequality and mistreatment 
of the natives. The Bangla-speaking people were treated as 
second-class citizens. As a result, when the election results were 
announced and Shaikh Mujibur Rahman had won, there was a lot 
of happiness. But the joy was short lived since Bhutto did not want 
to turn over the prime ministership of Pakistan to Shaikh Mujibur 
Rahman. Bhutto made his famous speech in the United Nations 
and told Shaikh Mujib, “Idhar hum udhar tum” (meaning, this side 
of Pakistan belongs to me and that side to you). To which Shaikh 
Mujib had said “now nothing can stop Bangladesh from coming 
into being.”
Right as soon as this was announced, the Pakistan army, the 
Panjabi and Pathan regiment, were sent to East Pakistan to crush 
down the rebellion. Coincidentally let me also add that Pakistan 
Air Force was never deployed. I often wonder why. Had Bhutto 
sent out the Air Force, the result would have been different. But 
Bhutto knew if East Pakistan survived Bhutto would have to step 
down from his seat.
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Already aware of the rising political uncertainty, the East Pakistani 
army had made a clean sweep on the cantonment arms and 
ammunition cache, which was reserved for [the] war period, and 
ran atop the mountains. This gave them a good vantage point. 
Once the Army had come over with their limited supply, West 
Pakistan never replenished their supplies. The Pakistani army 
came into Chittagong, with a lot of pomp, the army killed and 
raped with a relish. Shaikh Mujib had to call in the Indian army, to 
stop the Pakistani army. The chaos that ensued during this period 
was witnessed by me and my family. 
Crowds of furious pro-Mujib or Mukhti Bahini (Bangladeshi armed 
resistance movement) militia took strength from the incoming 
Indian army and this started a murderous rampage of Bangali 
versus Bihari killings. Mobs of machete yielding youth attacked 
Naseerabad Housing Society residents. I could hear people being 
hacked to death and women being abused. The houses on both 
sides of my home were raided and slaughtered, but we were lucky 
in the sense that our domestic helpers saved us, they accosted the 
mob at the gates and convinced them that the house was empty. 
We kept hidden in the house and then when the Pakistani army 
came to this city we were escorted out by them and taken to the 
cantonment. In the safety of the cantonment area we stayed for 
about three weeks and then took the last ship Safina e Arab to 
West Pakistan via Columbo. Indian forces at even at that time 
were stronger than Pakistani Navy, they closed off the waterway 
that led to West Pakistan and the ship was marooned near the 
Columbo waters for three weeks. Since my uncle, Commodore Asif 
Alavi, was the Pakistani ambassador to Columbo, he had to assert 
his official status and was thus able to get a concession for this 
ship to pass Indian waters. We had been lucky but many of our 
relatives were murdered or maimed during the raids and never 
got to get out of Bangladesh. Many Biharis of lesser financial 
means were left to rot in Bangladeshi camps.
The Pakistan army was soon put down by the Indian army 
and taken captive. [The] Pakistani army was sent to port cities 
Chittagong and Dhaka only, they were limited in number and 
outnumbered by the Indian forces. Also Bhutto failed to send in 
arms and ammunition, don’t know what he had in mind, [and] 
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soon the Indian border was sealed off from Pakistan and the army 
was sealed inside East Bangladesh. It was defeated and taken as 
prisoner of war to India. 
Bangladesh came into being and I lost my home and my 
childhood. It took me years to recover from the horror of violence 
that I had internalized and witnessed as a teenager. Years of 
bitterness have eroded relations between the two provinces to 
such a degree that it became impossible to visit Bangladesh again. 
I wish to go back and see my home once more. 
  
  
This essay was the product of an oral history assignment for the 
course Introduction to South Asian Studies (SOSC 2435) at York 
University and is the winner of the inaugural York Centre for Asian 
Research’s Undergraduate Asia Essay Award.
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